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Abstract. Oblivious transfer (OT) has been applied widely in privacy-
sensitive systems such as on-line transactions and electronic commerce
to protect users’ private information. Traceability is an interesting fea-
ture of such systems that the privacy of the dishonest users could be
traced by the service provider or a trusted third party (TTP). However,
previous research on OT mainly focused on designing protocols with
unconditional receiver’s privacy. Thus, traditional OT schemes cannot
fulﬁll the traceability requirements in the aforementioned applications.
In this paper, we address this problem by presenting a novel traceable
oblivious transfer (TOT) without involvement of any TTP. In the new
system, an honest receiver is able to make a ﬁxed number of choices with
perfect receiver privacy. If the receiver misbehaves and tries to request
more than a pre-ﬁxed number of choices, then all his previous choices
could be traced by the sender. We ﬁrst give the formal deﬁnition and
security model of TOT, then propose an eﬃcient TOT scheme, which is
proven secure under the proposed security model.
Keywords: Oblivious transfer · Secret sharing · Privacy · Traceability
1 Introduction
Oblivious Transfer is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives that has
been used widely in various security applications such as exchange of secrets
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[22,25], contract signing [3,12], secure multiparty computation [24] and Internet
of Things (IoT) [2]. Roughly speaking, an oblivious transfer scheme is an interac-
tive protocol running between a sender with a set of messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}
and a receiver with a set of choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. After running the protocol,
the receiver learns the intended messages mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk but cannot learn
anything about mi for i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. Meanwhile, the receiver’s choices
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} are completely hidden from the sender. The concept of oblivious
transfer was ﬁrst introduced by Rabin in 1981 [22]. In their original construc-
tion, the sender sends a single bit 0 or 1 to the receiver in such a way that with
1/2 probability the receiver will receive the same bit and with 1/2 probability
that the receiver will receive nothing. At the same time, the sender has no idea
whether the receiver receives the message or not. Since then, oblivious transfer
has attracted a lot of attentions, and a number of work [5,8,10,12,20] have been
done to improve the original OT scheme in diﬀerent aspects.
Even et al. [12] proposed a 1-out-of-2 OT (OT12) scheme, in which the sender
obliviously sends a message mi, i ∈ {0, 1}, to the receiver. Shortly after that,
Brassard et al. [5] extended the OT12 [12] to a more general k-out-of-n (OT
k
n)
setting, where the receiver is able to make multiple choices mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk
(σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) from a set of n messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} held
by the sender, meanwhile the receiver’s choices remain oblivious to the sender.
Since then, many subsequent work [10,19] aimed to design more eﬃcient OTkn
schemes. Diﬀerent from normal OTkn, another important research direction on
OT is adaptive OTkn [20]. In adaptive OT
k
n, the receiver can choose the messages
adaptively, namely, the ith value chosen by the receiver depends on the ﬁrst i−1
values.
In the early OT schemes reviewed above, there is no condition on restricting
the receiver’s ability. Any user in the system can act as a receiver and run the
OT protocol to choose messages held by the sender obliviously. To address this
problem, Coull et al. [11] proposed an OT scheme supporting access control
using state graphs, where for every transaction, the state of the receiver shifts
from one to another. The receiver can access the protected services only if some
of his states are not used. Camenisch et al. [6] proposed another approach to
enforce access control. In their system, the receiver ﬁrst authenticates himself to
a trusted third party to obtain some credentials. Later, the receiver proves to
the sender that he possesses a valid credential from the third party using zero-
knowledge proof. However, in this construction, the access policy is publicly
known.
To address this problem, Camenisch et al. [7] proposed another oblivi-
ous transfer with access control (AC-OT) in which only the receivers whose
attributes satisfy a predicate can access the services. In order to reduce the com-
putation and communication cost, Han et al. [14] proposed two eﬃcient oblivious
transfer schemes without using zero-knowledge proof. In addition, diﬀerent form
previous schemes, the receivers could obtain credentials from a trusted third
party but do not have to authenticate themselves. Thus, the communication
and computation cost is lower than previous schemes supporting access control.
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Later on, Han et al. [13] proposed accountable oblivious transfer with access
control, such that authorized users are allowed to access sensitive records with
accountable times. They claim that it is the ﬁrst AC-OT scheme where both the
timely revocation and the prevention of overusing records are addressed simul-
taneously. In particular, if a dishonest user misuse the given credential, then
his public identity will be revealed due to the k-time anonymous authentication
technique [23] is used.
There have been a lot of research works [8,15,21] on deﬁning OT security,
which can be classiﬁed into honest-but-curious model, half-simulation model [21],
full-simulation model [6–8] and Universally Composable (UC) model [13,15],
according to whether the OT scheme can provide simulatable security for the
sender and/or receiver. In the honest-but-curious model, all participants in the
protocol are assumed to be honest, which makes this model too idealistic for
practical use. Naor and Pinkas [21] introduced the half-simulation model that
allows malicious senders and receivers. However, in this model, the security of
the sender and receiver are considered separately. Half-simulation model achieves
simulatable security for sender privacy and computationally indistinguishability
for receiver privacy.
In order to capture the selective-failure attacks that may be performed by
the cheating sender, the full simulatability is introduced. In the full-simulation
model [8,15], it achieves simulatable security for both the receiver and sender
together. As for the UC-related model, the security of sender and receiver is
deﬁned by the indistinguishability between a real world and an ideal world as
described in the UC framework [9]. We then compare our proposed TOT with
typical works in Table 1 to highlight our distinction: it shows that our proposed
TOT enjoys traceability1 to the receiver’s choice if the user misbehaves, and
secures in the half simulation model under dynamic assumptions. In Table 1,
adaptive means that the receiver chooses the k records one after the other.
† denotes the various security models, which includes the honest but curious
model, the half/full simulation model and the UC model. Dynamic means that
the assumptions are depending on the number of n, such as strong Diﬃe-Hellman
assumptions [4].
1.1 Our Motivation
All the previous research on OT aimed to design OT schemes with perfect
receiver and sender privacy. In real-world applications [1,16], it is desirable for
the sender to trace the choices of the receiver if they misbehave. Thus, the
previous OT schemes are not suitable in these scenarios. To the best of our
knowledge, there is only one work [18] aiming to construct OT schemes with
traceable receiver’s privacy. However, this OT scheme involves a trusted time
1 Note that the traceability means that the previously choices of the cheating receiver
are revealed, which is the major distinction between our proposed TOT and the
construction in [13]. In the table, we use the symbol traceability∗ to distinguish our
work with that one in [13].
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Table 1. A comparative summary for OT protocols.
Function/algorithm NP [21] CT [10] CGS [8] KN [15] HSM∗ [13] Ours
Adaptive      
†-simulation Half Half Full UC UC Half
Standard model  ×    ×
Dynamic assumptions × ×  ×  
Access control × × × ×  
Traceability × × × ×  ×
Traceability∗ × × × × × 
server that publishes trapdoors on a time basis. After releasing the trapdoor,
the privacy of all the receivers, including the honest ones, will be lost. The moti-
vation of this work is to propose a new OT with traceable receiver’s privacy
such that the privacy of an honest receiver is protected unconditionally while
all the previous choices of a misbehaving receiver can be revealed by the sender
if the receiver makes more than the pre-determined number of choices in the
OT protocol. It is worth noting that in some real-life applications, the service
provider (i.e., database provider) may not only need to detect the identity of
dishonest users, but also want to reveal their choices that was made previously
in the system. By doing so, the service provider may revoke the operations on
the corresponding sensitive data which was anonymously and obliviously made
by that cheating user.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a novel traceable oblivious trans-
fer that allows a sender to trace the dishonest receivers’ choices without the help
of any trusted third party. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We present the ﬁrst traceable adaptive OTkn scheme and analysed its security
under the half-simulation model [21];
– The traceable OTkn scheme allows the receiver to obtain a ﬁxed number of
messages mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk from the message set {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} held by
the sender where σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, while receiver’s choice is
hidden from the sender;
– The traceable OTkn scheme allows the receiver cannot learn anything on
message mi such that i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In particular,
if the receiver makes more than k requests, then all his previous choices
(mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk) could be traced by the sender.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We intro-
duce the formal deﬁnition and the security model of TOT in Sect. 2. Some prelim-
inaries are presented in Sect. 3 and a concrete scheme TOT scheme is presented
in Sect. 4. We prove its security in Sect. 5 and the paper is concluded in Sect. 6.
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2 Formal Deﬁnition and Security Model
We present the formal deﬁnition and security model for TOT in this section.
There are two participants in a TOT system, namely, a sender S and a receiver
R. S possesses a set of messages {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and R makes a set of choices
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} such that σi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
2.1 Definitions of Traceable Oblivious Transfer
A TOT scheme is essentially an interactive protocol consisting of a tuple of PPT
algorithms (Setup, Commitment, Request, Response, Extract, Tracing).
1. Setup: Taking as input of a security parameter κ, the setup algorithm outputs
the system public parameters.
params ← Setup(1κ)
2. KeyGen: Taking as input of the public parameter params, the key generation
algorithm outputs a retrievable key pair2 (rpk, rsk) for the receiver and a one-
time key pair for the sender.
(rpk, rsk) ← KeyGen(params)
(opk, osk) ← KeyGen(params)
3. Commitment : Taking as input of the system parameters params, the retriev-
able public key rpk of the receiver, the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn and one-
time secret key osk of the sender, the commitment algorithm outputs a set
of ciphertext c1, c2, . . . , cn.
c1, c2, . . . , cn ← Commitment(rpk,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, osk, params)
4. Request : Taking as input of the intended indexes σ, the retrievable private
key rsk and params, this algorithms outputs the commitment of the user’s
choice.
Aσ ← Request(σ; rsk; params)
5. Response: Taking as input of the commitment Aσ from the receiver, the secret
of the sender, the output of the algorithm is response of the sender.
Dσ ← Response(Aσ, osk, params)
6. Extract : Taking as input of the response Dσ from the sender, the cipertext
cα and the system parameters params, output the message of the receiver’s
choice.
mσ ← Extract(Dσ, cσ, params)
2 We assume there exists a public key infrastructure (PKI) issuing certiﬁcates on the
users’ public keys in our system.
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7. Tracing : The Tracing algorithm is performed by the sender, taking as input
of the k + 1 transcripts Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk+1 from a receiver, the retrievable
public key rpk and params, outputs the receiver’s choice σ1, σ2, . . . , σk.
σ1, σ2, . . . , σk ← Tracing(Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk+1 ; rpk; params)
Correctness: We require that for any security parameter κ ∈ N, if params ←
ParamGen(1κ), (rpk, rsk)←KeyGen(params), (opk, osk) ← KeyGen(params),
c1, c2, . . . , cn ← Commitment(rpk,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, osk, params), Aσ ← Request
(σ; rsk, params), Dσ ← Response(Aσ, osk; parmas), then
– The receiver can extract the correct message.
Pr(mσ ← Extract(Dσ, rsk, params)) = 1.
– If the receiver makes less than k + 1 requests, then the sender cannot obtain
any information about the receiver’s choice.
Pr(‘⊥’ ← Tracing(Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσδ ; rpk; params|δ ≤ k)) = 1.
– If the receiver makes more than k requests, then the sender can trace the
previous choice of the receiver.
Pr(σ1, σ2, . . . , σδ ← Tracing(Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσδ ; rpk; params|δ > k)) = 1.
2.2 Security Model for Traceable Oblivious Transfer
In this paper, we review the half-simulation model proposed in [21] to evalu-
ate the security of TOT schemes. Besides the sender and receiver’s privacy, we
deﬁne a new property named traceability to capture the additional feature of
TOT. In the half-simulation model, the security of the sender and receiver is
considered separately. A secure TOT scheme should meet the following security
requirements:
1. Receiver’s Privacy :
– If R makes less than k+1 requests, then S cannot obtain any information
about R’s choice.
– For any two diﬀerent choice sets C = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} and C′ = {σ′1, σ′2,
. . . , σ′k}, the transcripts A = {Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk} and A′ = {A′σ1 , A′σ2 ,
. . . , A′σk} received by S corresponding to M = {mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk} andM′ = {m′σ1 ,m′σ2 , . . . ,m′σk} are indistinguishable if the received messagesM = {mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk} and M′ = {m′σ1 ,m′σ2 , . . . ,m′σk} are identi-
cally distributed.
2. Sender’s Privacy :
– R cannot obtain any information on mi, i /∈ {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
– In the half-simulation model, the security of R is deﬁned by the real-
world/ideal-world paradigm. In the real world, R and S execute the
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protocol. In the ideal world, the protocol is implemented with the help
a trusted third party (TTP). S sends all the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn
to the TTP. While R sends his choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} adaptively to
the TTP. If {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the TTP sends messages
{mσ1 ,mσ2 , . . . ,mσk} to the receiver. A TOT scheme is said to provide
the privacy of the sender if for any receiver R in real world, there exists
an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) R′ in the ideal world such that
the output of R and R′ are indistinguishable.
3. Traceability :
Traceability is not a necessary requirement for traditional OT schemes, we
consider traceability as a special property of our TOT schemes. If a dishonest
receiver R makes k + 1 choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk, σk+1} from S, suppose A =
{Aσ1 , Aσ2 , . . . , Aσk , Aσk+1} is the transcript set of the k + 1 choices, then S
is able to trace R’s choices through an eﬃcient PPT algorithm Tracing.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some preliminaries that will be used throughout
this paper.
Definition 1. Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) Assumption: Given
a cyclic group Gq of prime order q, the DDH problem states that, given
g, ga, gb, Z ∈ Gq for some random a, b ∈ Zq and a random generator g, decide
Z = gab. Deﬁne the success probability of a polynomial algorithm A in solving
the DDH problem as:
SuccDDHA,Gq (κ) = |Pr[A(Gq, g, ga, gb, gab) = 1] − Pr[A(Gq, g, ga, gb, Z) = 1]|
where κ = log(q) is the security parameter. The DDH assumption states that for
any probabilistic polynomial algorithm time A, SuccDDHA,Gq (κ) is negligible in κ.
Definition 2. One More Diﬃe-Hellman (OMDH) Assumption [21]:
Given a cyclic group Gq of prime order q and g is a generator of G, let DH(·)
be the Diﬃe-Hellman oracle that takes X = gx, Y = gy ∈ Gq for some x, y ∈ Zq
and returns the Diﬃe-Hellman value Z = gxy. Let C(·) be a challenge oracle that
takes no input and returns a random element in Gq. Let Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt denote
the challenges returned by C(·), we say an OMDH adversary A wins if A can
output the sequence of Diﬃe-Hellman values Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt of all DHP instances
with input X,Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , t and the number of queries qdh made by A to the
Diﬃe-Hellman oracle DH(·) is less than t. Deﬁne the success probability of a
polynomial algorithm A in solving the OMDH problem as:
SuccOMDHA,Gq (κ) = Pr[Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt ← ADH(·),qdh<t(X, (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt ← C(·)))]
the OMDH assumption states that, for any polynomial algorithm A,
SuccOMDHA,Gq (κ) is negligible in κ.
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4 One Construction of Eﬃcient Traceable Oblivious
Transfer Schemes
The proposed scheme consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms as follows.
1. Setup: Let Gq denote a subgroup of Zp with prime order q and g, h1, h2, . . . ,
hn be generators of Gq, where p = 2q + 1 is also prime. Choose two collision
resistant hash functions H,H1 such that H : N → Z∗q and H1 : Gq → Gq.
The system parameters params = (Gq, p, q, g, h1, h2, . . . , hn,H,H1).
2. KeyGen: The receiver R chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q and generates
a retrievable key pair (rpk, rsk) = (gs, s). R chooses k random numbers
s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈R Zq and computes S1 = gs1 , S2 = gs2 , . . . , Sk = gsk . S chooses
a random number z ∈R Z∗q and generates a one-time key pair (opk, osk) =
(gz, z). R publishes rpk and S1, S2, . . . , Sk and S publishes opk.
3. Commitment Phase: S computes the ciphertext of m1,m2, . . . ,mn as ci =
H1((rpk · hH(i)i )z) · mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S sends c1, c2, . . . , cn to R.
4. Request: In the i-th round,
– R chooses ri ∈R Z∗q , and computes Bi = gri , B′i = hriαi and Ai =
(gri)s(hriαi)
H(αi), where αi ∈R {1, 2, . . . , n} is the receiver’s choice and
f(Bi) = s + s1Bi + . . . skBki .
– R sends (Bi, B′i, f(Bi), Ai) to S, and simultaneously does the following
proof of knowledge. PoK{(H(αi), s) : A = Bsi B′iH(αi) ∧ rpk = gs}.
5. Response: S ﬁrst veriﬁes Bi, the secret share f(Bi) and the PoK by check-
ing:
– S checks whether Bi appears in previous session.
– gf(Bi) ?= rpk · SBi1 · SB
2
i
2 · . . . · SB
k
i
k . If this equation holds,
– S veriﬁes PoK{(H(αi), s) : Ai = Bsi B′iH(αi) ∧ rpk = gs}.
If either of the veriﬁcation fails, S aborts; Otherwise, S stores (Bi, B′i, f(Bi),
Ai) and S generates Di = Azi and sends Di to R.
6. Extract: Upon receiving Di from S, R computes Kαi = D
1
ri
i and extracts
the intended message mαi = cαi/H1(Kαi).
7. Tracing: Once R and S execute the OT for k+1 times, S obtains k+1 shares
of the secret. S is able to recover s from secret sharing. Once s is calculated,
for the previous commitments Ai = Bsi B
′
i
H(αi), given Bi, B′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. S
is able to retrieve αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The proof of knowledge PoK{(H(αi), s) : Ai = Bsi B′iH(αi) ∧ rpk = gs} can
be implemented as follows:
1. R randomly chooses two random numbers t1, t2 ∈ Zp, computes T1 =
Bt1i B
′
i
t2 , T2 = gt1 , c = H(f(Bi), Bi, B′i, T1, T2), v1 = t1 − cs and v2 =
t2 − cH(αi). R sends v1, v2, T1, T2 to S.
2. S accepts if both AciB
v1
i B
′
i
v2 = T1 and rpkcgv1 = T2 hold.
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5 Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed TOT scheme is correct.
Proof. The correctness of the proposed scheme is shown as follows:
1. Correctness of PoK: If R is honest, then R has knowledge of H(αi) and s,
R computes v1 = t1 − cs and v2 = t2 − cH(αi). S can verify correctly that:
AcBv1i B
′
i
v2 = Bsci B
′
i
H(αi)cBt1−csi B
′
i
t2−cH(αi) = Bt1i B
′
i
t2 = T1.
rpkcgv1 = gscgt1−cs = gt1 = T2.
2. Correctness of extracting the message:
mαi =
cαi
H1(Kαi)
=
mαiH1(rpk · hH(αi)αi )z)
H1((griszh
riH(αi)z
αi )
1
ri )
=
mαiH1(g
szh
H(αi)z
αi )
H1(gszh
H(αi)z
αi )
= mαi
Theorem 2. The proposed TOT scheme provides receiver’s privacy for honest
receivers.
Proof. We followed the methods described in [17] to analyse the security of
the proposed TOT scheme. Suppose a honest receiver runs the OT protocol
with the sender for k times. The sender could obtain k pairs of transcripts
{(A1, B1, B′1), (A2, B2, B′2), . . . , (Ak, Bk, B′k)} such that A1 = (gr1)s(hr1α1)H(α1),
A2 = (gr2)s(hr2α2)
H(α2), . . . , Ak = (grk)s(hrkαk)
H(αk), where α1, α2, . . . , αk ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} are the user’s choice and r1, r2, . . . , rk ∈R Z∗q . Given Bj = grj , rpk =
gs for some random rj ∈ Z∗q , it is computation-infeasible to decide the masked
value equals grjs or a random value Z in Gq, thus for any two transcripts Aj
and Ai such that 1 ≤ i = j ≤ k from the user, they are computationally indis-
tinguishable to the service provider as long as the DDH problem is hard in Gq.
Theorem 3. The proposed TOT scheme provides sender’s privacy.
Proof. Suppose a honest receiver runs the OT protocol with the sender k
times. For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiver Rˆ in the real-
world model, we are able to construct a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious
receiver Rˆ∗ in the ideal model such that the outputs of Rˆ and Rˆ∗ are indistin-
guishable.
Brieﬂy, the ideal-world cheating receiver Rˆ∗ can extract α from the proof
of knowledge. This enables him to obtain the message mα form the TTP . Rˆ∗
simulates the honest sender S in the real-world and interacts with Rˆ as follows:
1. S sends m1,m2, . . . ,mn to the trusted third party TTP .
2. Rˆ∗ sends c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
n to TTP such that c
∗
i ∈R Gq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. Rˆ∗ monitors the outputs Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . , Aαk of Rˆ, Rˆ
∗ chooses A∗α1 , A
∗
α2 , . . . ,
A∗αk ∈R Gq.
Eﬃcient Traceable Oblivious Transfer and Its Applications 619
4. After Rˆ runs Request protocol, if the veriﬁcation of PoK fails, Rˆ∗ sends a
value αi /∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} to TTP.
5. If the veriﬁcation of PoK successes, Rˆ∗ extracts Rˆ’s choice αi from the PoK
and gets back D∗σ1 ,D
∗
σ2 , . . . , D
∗
σk
such that D∗σi = A
z∗
αi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
6. If Rˆ can compute Kαi = g
szh
H(αi)z
αi , Rˆ∗ sends αi to TTP , TTP returns
c∗αi
mαi
.
7. Rˆ∗ outputs (A∗α1 , A
∗
α2 , . . . , A
∗
αk
,D∗σ1 ,D
∗
σ2 , . . . , D
∗
σk
, c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
n).
We can see from Theorem2 and Claim (see proof below) that {Aα1 , Aα2 , . . . ,
Aαk} and {c1, c2, . . . , cn} are indistinguishable from random elements in Gq. In
addition, the sets of {Dσ1 ,Dσ2 , . . . , Dσk} and {D∗σ1 ,D∗σ2 , . . . , D∗σk} are identi-
cally distributed. Therefore, no distinguishers can distinguish the outputs of Rˆ
and Rˆ′ with a non-negligible probability.
Claim. The proposed encryption scheme is semantic secure.
Proof. The security proof is performed using random oracle. Suppose the sim-
ulator B maintains a table T1 for the hash queries. B obtains n + 1 values
Z, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn from the challenge oracle C(·). B sets the one-time public key of
the sender opk = Z and sends Z, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn to a PPT adversary A. Assume A
queries on a message mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1. B ﬁrst obtain the diﬃe-hellman value
of (Z, Yi) with help of DH(·) oracle. Then A checks if DH(Z, Yi) has existed in
T1. If not, B chooses a new random Zi ∈ Gq and stores (DH(Z, Yi), Zi) to T1.
Otherwise, assume H1(DH(Z, Yi)) = Zi, B returns ci = Zi ·mi as the ciphertext
on mi. After n − 1 queries, A sends two challenge messages m∗0,m∗1, B chooses
b ∈ {0, 1} and a random number Zn ∈ Gq. A sets the ciphertext c∗b on m∗b as
c∗b = Zn · m∗b . If A has a non-negligible probability  in distinguishing c∗b than
random guess. Then with an overwhelming probability that DH(Z, Yn) has been
submitted in the hash queries. Thus B breaks the OMDH assumption, we reach
a contradiction. Therefore the proposed encryption scheme is semantic secure.
Theorem 4. The proposed TOT scheme provides traceability to the receiver.
Proof. After running the protocol k + 1 times with the receiver, the sender
obtains k+1 shares of the retrievable private key s with respect to the unknown
integers s1, s2, . . . , sk such that
f(Bi) = s + s1Bi + s2B2i . . . + skB
k
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1.
The corresponding linear equations in a matrix form are as follows:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 B1 B21 · · · Bk1
1 B2 B22 · · · Bk2
...
...
...
...
...
1 Bk+1 B2k+1 · · · Bkk+1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ *
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
s
s1
...
sk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
f(B1)
f(B2)
...
f(Bk+1)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
As we can see the coeﬃcient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix or a non-singular
matrix. The determinant of such a matrix is not equal to zero. Thus the equations
have a unique solution to s, s1, s2, . . . , sk.
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Once the sender obtains the value of the retrievable private key rsk. For
previous commitments on receiver’s choice Ai = Brski B
′
i
H(αi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Since S has store the values of Bi and B′i in the i-th round. Thus, the sender
could trace the receiver choice αi = j in the i-th round by checking that Ai =
Brski B
′
i
H(αi) = Brski B
′
i
H(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel oblivious transfer scheme that can achieve
retrievable receiver’s privacy without the help of a trusted third party. The mis-
behaving receivers’ choices could be traced while the honest receivers’ privacy is
well protected. We proved the security of the scheme under the proposed security
model. We leave the construction of an adaptive traceable OT scheme that is
proven secure under non-dynamic assumptions in the full-simulation model or
UC model as our future work.
Acknowledgements. This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of
China (2017YFB0802000), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos.
61772418, 61402366). Yinghui Zhang is supported by New Star Team of Xi’an Univer-
sity of Posts & Telecommunications (2016-02).
References
1. Aiello, B., Ishai, Y., Reingold, O.: Priced oblivious transfer: how to sell digital
goods. In: Pﬁtzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 119–135.
Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44987-6 8
2. Ashton, K.: That internet of things? Thing (1999)
3. Ben-Or, M., Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Rivest, R.L.: A fair protocol for signing
contracts. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 36(1), 40–46 (1990)
4. Boneh, D., Boyen, X.: Short signatures without random oracles. In: Cachin, C.,
Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 56–73. Springer,
Heidelberg (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3 4
5. Brassard, G., Cre´peau, C., Robert, J.-M.: All-or-nothing disclosure of secrets. In:
Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 234–238. Springer, Hei-
delberg (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47721-7 17
6. Camenisch, J., Dubovitskaya, M., Neven, G.: Oblivious transfer with access control.
In: Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS 2009, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 9–13 November 2009, pp. 131–140
(2009)
7. Camenisch, J., Dubovitskaya, M., Neven, G., Zaverucha, G.M.: Oblivious trans-
fer with hidden access control policies. In: Catalano, D., Fazio, N., Gennaro, R.,
Nicolosi, A. (eds.) PKC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6571, pp. 192–209. Springer, Heidelberg
(2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19379-8 12
8. Camenisch, J., Neven, G., Shelat, A.: Simulatable adaptive oblivious transfer. In:
Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 573–590. Springer, Hei-
delberg (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72540-4 33
Eﬃcient Traceable Oblivious Transfer and Its Applications 621
9. Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic
protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, p. 136 (2001)
10. Chu, C.-K., Tzeng, W.-G.: Eﬃcient k -out-of-n oblivious transfer schemes with
adaptive and non-adaptive queries. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) PKC 2005. LNCS, vol.
3386, pp. 172–183. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
540-30580-4 12
11. Coull, S., Green, M., Hohenberger, S.: Controlling access to an oblivious database
using stateful anonymous credentials. In: Jarecki, S., Tsudik, G. (eds.) PKC 2009.
LNCS, vol. 5443, pp. 501–520. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.
1007/978-3-642-00468-1 28
12. Even, S., Goldreich, O., Lempel, A.: A randomized protocol for signing contracts.
Commun. ACM 28(6), 637–647 (1985)
13. Han, J., Susilo, W., Mu, Y., Au, M.H., Cao, J.: AAC-OT: accountable oblivious
transfer with access control. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 10(12), 2502–2514
(2015)
14. Han, J., Susilo, W., Mu, Y., Yan, J.: Eﬃcient oblivious transfers with access control.
Comput. Math. Appl. 63(4), 827–837 (2012)
15. Kurosawa, K., Nojima, R.: Simple adaptive oblivious transfer without random
oracle. In: Matsui, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5912, pp. 334–346.
Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7 20
16. Liu, W., Mu, Y., Yang, G.: An eﬃcient privacy-preserving e-coupon system. In: Lin,
D., Yung, M., Zhou, J. (eds.) Inscrypt 2014. LNCS, vol. 8957, pp. 3–15. Springer,
Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16745-9 1
17. Liu, W., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Yu, Y.: Eﬃcient e-coupon systems with strong user
privacy. Telecommun. Syst. 64(4), 695–708 (2017)
18. Ma, X., Xu, L., Zhang, F.: Oblivious transfer with timed-release receiver’s privacy.
J. Syst. Softw. 84(3), 460–464 (2011)
19. Mu, Y., Zhang, J., Varadharajan, V.: m out of n oblivious transfer. In: Batten, L.,
Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2002. LNCS, vol. 2384, pp. 395–405. Springer, Heidelberg
(2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0 30
20. Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Oblivious transfer with adaptive queries. In: Wiener, M.
(ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 573–590. Springer, Heidelberg (1999).
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1 36
21. Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Computationally secure oblivious transfer. J. Cryptol. 18(1),
1–35 (2005)
22. Rabin, M.O.: How to exchange secrets by oblivious transfer (1981)
23. Teranishi, I., Furukawa, J., Sako, K.: k-times anonymous authentication. IEICE
Trans. 92-A(1), 147–165 (2009)
24. Yao, A.C.: Protocols for secure computations (extended abstract). In: 23rd Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 3–5
November 1982, pp. 160–164 (1982)
25. Yao, A.C.: How to generate and exchange secrets (extended abstract). In: 27th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Toronto, Canada, 27–29
October 1986, pp. 162–167 (1986)
